


89-1250

NO.



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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES  
OCTOBER TERM, 1989

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IN THE MATTER OF THE EXTRADITION OF  
ANTONIO MANZI

ANTONIO MANZI, PETITIONER

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI  
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF  
APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

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A P P E N D I X

THE OPINIONS BELOW

---

Antonio Manzi  
(Pro Se)  
c/o John F. Moriarty  
DUCHARME, MORIARTY  
& WILSON  
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Holyoke, MA 01040  
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44p



## APPENDIX

### THE OPINIONS BELOW

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

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No. 88-2128

IN THE MATTER OF THE EXTRA-  
DITION OF ANTONIO MANZI

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  
Petitioner, Appellee,

v.

ANTONIO MANZI,  
Respondent, Appellant,

---

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT  
COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS  
[Hon. Frank H. Freedman, U.S. Dist. Judge]

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Before  
Breyer and Selya, Circuit Judges,  
and Caffrey,\* Senior District Judge

---

John F. Moriarty, Jr., with whom Cornelius  
J. Moriarty, II, and Ducharme, Moriarty &  
Wilson were on brief for the respondent.

Mitchell D. Dembin, Assistant United States  
Attorney, with whom Jeremiah T. O'Sullivan,  
United States Attorney, was on brief for  
the United States

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NOVEMBER 1, 1989

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\*Of the District of Massachusetts, sitting  
by designation.



Per Curiam. This case is an appeal from a denial of a petition for writ of habeas corpus which sought review of a magistrate's order for the extradition of the appellant, Antonio Manzi, to Italy. On February 11, 1985, the Republic of Italy filed a request for the extradition of Manzi, pursuant to the extradition treaty between the United States and Italy ("the Treaty").<sup>1</sup> The Italian government seeks the extradition of Manzi on convictions of armed robbery and

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1. Extradition Treaty between the United States of America and Italy, Oct. 13, 1983, U.S.-Italy, T.I.A.S. No. 10837.



receiving stolen property.<sup>2</sup> On May 18, 1988, U.S. Magistrate Michael A. Ponsor issued an Extradition Certificate and Order of Commitment certifying compliance with the Treaty and ordering U.S. authorities to surrender Manzi to Italian authorities. On July 18, 1988, Manzi filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus objecting to the magistrate's order. On August 31, 1988, Chief Judge Frank H.

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2. Originally, the Italian government had also sought extradition of Manzi for charges of criminal association, extortion, one count of attempted murder, and two counts of murder for which he was convicted in absentia. As clarified in the briefs and on oral argument, however, the Italian government has withdrawn the warrants relating to criminal association, extortion, attempted murder, and murder. The warrants for armed robbery and receiving stolen property remain outstanding.



Freedman adopted all the findings of the magistrate, determined there was sufficient basis for extradition, and denied the petition for writ of habeas corpus. On October 5, 1988, Manzi appealed the district court's judgment, and now we affirm.

In examining habeas corpus petitions challenging extradition proceedings, the scope of inquiry is limited.

Romeo v. Roache, 820 F.2d 540, 542 (1st Cir. 1987); Greci v. Birknes, 527 F.2d 956, 958 (1st Cir. 1976).

Direct judicial review of extradition proceedings is not available, and habeas corpus review "is not a means of rehearing what the magistrate already decided." Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 312 (1925). See Sabatier v. Dabrowski, 586 F.2d 866, 868 (1st Cir. 1978). This court



may only examine "whether the magistrate had jurisdiction to consider the matter, whether the offense charged is within the treaty and by a somewhat liberal construction, whether there was any evidence warranting the finding that there was reasonable ground to believe the accused guilty." Romeo, 820 F.2d at 542-43 (quoting Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 312 (1925); Brauch v. Raiche, 618 F.2d 843, 847 (1st Cir. 1980)). In light of these standards, we shall review the appellant-Manzi's arguments on appeal.

## II.


The appellant-Manzi's numerous arguments on appeal can be analyzed in three general categories: (1) the magistrate denied him due process of law in the extradition proceedings; (2) the magistrate failed to comply



with various provisions of the Treaty; and (3) the magistrate erred in finding that receiving stolen property was an extraditable offense under the Treaty. This court shall discuss each argument in turn.

A. Due Process

The appellant-Manzi has raised a number of arguments claiming the magistrate denied him due process of law in the extradition proceeding. Specifically, Manzi objects to the magistrate's refusal to order the translation of an Italian appellate court decision purportedly reversing Manzi's convictions in Italy and the translation of several Italian statutes which may provide credit for time served by Manzi in Massachusetts prison. Further, Manzi objects to the magistrate's refusal to allow the



the deposition of an INS agent who arrested an individual allegedly determined to kill the appellant in the United States. Finally, Manzi objects to the magistrate's refusal to hold an evidentiary hearing to decide the danger to Manzi's life from extradition to Italy.

In considering Manzi's claims, this court recognizes that serious due process concerns may merit review beyond the narrow scope of inquiry in extradition proceedings. See Romeo, 820, F.2d at 544 (court considered and rejected claim that due process required competency hearing in extradition proceeding); Plaster v. United States, 720 F.2d 340, 348-49 (4th Cir. 1983) (court considered whether due process implicated when government attempted to extradite



U.S. serviceman despite prior immunity agreement); Matter of Burt, 737 F.2d 1477, 1482-87 (7th Cir. 1984) (court considered and rejected claims that considerable delay in extradition violated fifth amendment due process). See also David v. Attorney Gen. of United States, 699 F.2d 411, 415 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 832 (1983); Esposito v. Adams, 700 F. Supp. 1470, 1471 (N.D. Ill. 1988). In the instant case, however, the appellant's claims do not raise fundamental issues of substantive or procedural due process warranting our review.

First, Manzi has produced no factual evidence suggesting that the requested translations are even relevant to his case. As noted by the magistrate, the untranslated




appellate decision does not name Manzi as a party, and Manzi has presented no other evidence that the case is binding on him. Furthermore, the appellate decision only concerns charges which the Italian government has subsequently withdrawn and which are no longer a basis for extradition. See supra note 2. Finally, the untranslated statutes concern issues of credit for time served in the United States, and thus only raise issues which should properly be placed before Italian authorities.

Second, Manzi's request for a deposition and an evidentiary hearing concerning his safety in returning to Italy runs afoul of the well-established rule of "non-inquiry" in these matters. See Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 789-90 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882 (1986); Eain v. Wilkes, 641



F.2d 504, 516 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981); Escobedo v. United States, 623 F.2d 1098, 1105 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1036 (1980); Sindona v. Grant, 619 F.2d 167, 174-75 (2d Cir. 1980); Peroff v. Hylton, 563 F.2d 1099, 1102 (4th Cir. 1977) (per curiam); Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189, 1192-93 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 989 (1972); Matter of Extradition of Pazienza, 619 F. Supp. 611, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Matter of Extradition of Singh, 123 F.R.D. 127, 129-40 (D.N.J. 1987). Traditionally, federal courts have refused to consider questions relating to the procedures or treatment that might await an individual on extradition. See Escobedo, 623 F.2d at 1105; Sindona, 619 F.2d at 174-75; Peroff,



563 F.2d at 1102. Courts have chosen to defer these questions to the executive branch because of its exclusive power to conduct foreign affairs. See Escobedo, 623 F.2d at 1105; Sindona, 619 F.2d at 174; Peroff, 563 F.2d at 1102. Furthermore, courts have applied this rule where an individual facing extradition has questioned a foreign country's ability to provide adequate safety and protection. See Sindona, 619 F.2d at 174; Peroff v. Hylton, 542 F.2d at 1247, 1249 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1063 (1977). Given this well-established rule and Manzi's failure to produce any factual evidence of a threat to his safety, the magistrate acted properly in denying Manzi's request for a deposition and an evidentiary hearing.



## B. Compliance with Treaty

The appellant-Manzi has raised a number of technical objections regarding procedural compliance with the Treaty. Specifically, Manzi makes four claims: (1) the documents supporting extradition did not contain an adequate recital of procedures available to a person convicted in absentia pursuant to article X, section 5 of the Treaty; (2) an Italian magistrate did not sign the summary of facts underlying the Italian charges pursuant to article X, section 3(b) of the Treaty; (3) the receiving stolen property charge did not contain a description of the time of offense pursuant to article X, section 2(b) ; and (4) certain other documents were not signed by an Italian magistrate or judicial officer pursuant to article X,



section 2(b); and (4) certain other documents were not signed by an Italian magistrate or judicial officer pursuant to article X, section 7(b). In this case, none of these technical objections raises a question within our scope of inquiry.

This court's review of the proceedings below is limited to whether there is jurisdiction, whether the offense is within the Treaty, and whether evidence exists to support the magistrate's determination of probable cause. See Romeo, 820 F.2d at 847. All of these technical objections were heard by the magistrate and, after due consideration, were decided against the appellant. On habeas corpus review, the district court adopted the findings of the magistrate as to the technical objections. Accordingly, these issues are not subject to further review.



no merit.

Article II, section 1 of the Treaty states:

An offense, however dominated, shall be an extraditable offense only if it is punishable under the laws of both Contracting Parties by deprivation of liberty for a period of more than one year or by a more severe penalty.


This section of the Treaty imposes a requirement of "double criminality" on all extraditable offenses. See Brauch, 618 F.2d at 850-51 (interpreting similar provision in extradition treaty between United States and Great Britain). Under the Treaty, an extraditable offense must be a crime under the laws of both contracting countries. This requirement is "central to extradition law" and has been embodied in other United States extradition treaties. See id.

The Supreme Court has not interpreted this "double criminality" provision to require exact congruity



- C. Extraditability of Receiving  
Stolen Property Charge

Finally, the appellant-Manzi questions whether the charge of receiving stolen property is properly an extraditable offense under the Treaty. Manzi argues that the Treaty requires that an extraditable offense, in this case receiving stolen property, be the same under both the laws of Italy and Massachusetts. Further, comparing the Massachusetts and Italian criminal codes, Manzi claims that the Massachusetts statute for receiving stolen property requires an element of scienter which is not present in the comparable Italian statute. Thus, Manzi argues that the charge is different in both countries and non-extraditable under the Treaty. On a careful review of the applicable law in this case, Manzi's argument has



of offenses. In Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309 (1922), the Court wrote:

The law does not require that the name by which the crime is described in the two countries be the same; nor that the scope of liability shall be coextensive, or, in other respects, the same in the two countries. It is enough if the particular act charged is criminal in both jurisdictions.

259 U.S. at 312. Further, this court has held that "double criminality" requires only "that the acts upon which the . . . charges are based are proscribed by similar provisions of federal law, [state] law or the law of the preponderance of the states." Brauch, 618 F.2d at 851. See Matter of Extradition of Russell, 789 F.2d 801, 803-04 (9th Cir. 1986) ("each element of the offense purportedly committed in a foreign



country need not be identical to the elements of the similar offense in the United States."); Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 579-80 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986).

In this case, the acts which make up the charge against Manzi in Italy would clearly be criminal in Massachusetts. Manzi was charged and convicted of purchasing a stolen Mercedes automobile, replacing the identification numbers and license plates on the car, and selling the "clean" car for 3,600,000 lire. Furthermore, the Italian court convicted Manzi of "having acquired or in some way received a Mercedes Automobile . . . knowing of its unlawful provenance." These facts and findings would clearly satisfy the elements of receiving stolen



property under Mass. Gen. L. ch. 26, Sec. 60.<sup>3</sup> Given the facts of this case and the requirements of "dual criminality," the charge of receiving stolen property is clearly an extraditable offense under the Treaty.


In sum, the district court did not err in denying Manzi's petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the magistrate's certification of extradition. The district court's judgment is hereby affirmed.

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3. Chapter 266, section 60 of the Massachusetts General Laws provides, in pertinent part:

Whoever buys, receives or aids in the concealment of stolen or embezzled property, knowing it to have been stolen or embezzled, or whoever with intent to defraud buys, receives, or aids in the concealment of property, knowing it to have been obtained from a person by a false pretense . . . shall . . . be punished for a first offense by imprisonment in jail or house of correction for not more than two and one half years, or by a fine of not more than two hundred fifty dollars . . . .

Mass. Gen. L. ch. 266, Sec. 60 (1986).



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

IN THE MATTER OF       )  
THE EXTRADITION       ) M.B.D. NO. 85-0008-F  
OF ANTONIO MANZI       )  
                    Petitioner

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

August 31, 1988

FREEDMAN, C.J.

On May 18, 1988 a United States magistrate issued an Extradition Certification and Order of Commitment regarding the government of Italy's request to extradite Antonio Manzi who is presently incarcerated in the Cedar Junction Prison in Massachusetts for drug related convictions. Before the Court is petitioner Antonio Manzi's "Petition For Writ of Habeas Corpus and Certiorari" in which he argues that the Magistrate acted contrary to law in signing the Certification. Extradition has been stayed pending



resolution of the present motion. In his petition, Manzi repeats a host of claims raised before and rejected by the Magistrate. The government has once again objected to the petition and has filed a written brief.

At the outset, the Court recognizes its limited role in the extradition process. There are three issues to be decided by this Court: "whether the magistrate had jurisdiction, whether the offense charged is within the treaty [between the United States and Italy] and, by a somewhat liberal construction, whether there was any evidence warranting the finding that there was reasonable ground to believe the accused guilty." Brauch v. Raiche, 618 F.2d 843, 847 (1st Cir. 1980)\_(quoting Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 312 (1925)). Since petitioner does not challenge the



Magistrate's jurisdiction, the Court proceeds to the second and third questions.

Regarding the issue of whether the offenses charged are within the treaty, petitioner attacks the Magistrate's findings as inconsistent with the United States-Italy extradition agreement.

Petitioner presents the following arguments in support of this allegation:

that a judicial authority failed to sign the relevant documents; that Manzi's sentence on his robbery conviction has less than six months remaining to be served and thus is outside the scope of the treaty; that the government's statements regarding the offenses charged are not sufficient; that the stolen property charge lacks an element that the Massachusetts version requires; and that some of the offenses are political and, therefore, not extraditable.



The Court has considered each of these arguments and agrees with the Magistrate that they are all without merit. The government has complied with the treaty as fully explained by the Magistrate in his order and by the government in its opposition to the present petition.

The final issue is that of probable cause. There is no doubt in this case that there is probable cause to believe that Antonio Manzi has committed the offenses charged. In fact, he was convicted in Italy of robbery and receiving stolen property and, in absentia, of two murders, attempted murder and criminal association. These convictions, along with supporting documentation provided by Italy, meet the probable cause test for extradi-



ability.

Finally, the Court summarily rejects petitioner's claims of due process violations regarding the Magistrate's refusal to order a translation of an Italian appellate court decision and whether Manzi may be entitled to good time credit. In addition to being outside the scope of this Court's limited review, petitioner has fallen far short of his requirement to come forth with adequate evidence supporting these blanket allegations.

For these reasons, petitioner's "Petition For Writ of Habeas Corpus and Certiorari" is hereby DENIED.

It is So Ordered.



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

IN THE MATTER OF     )  
THE EXTRADITION     ) M.B.D. No. 85-08-F  
OF ANTONIO MANZI     )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER  
REGARDING EXTRADITION  
CERTIFICATION AND  
ORDER OF COMMITMENT

May 18, 1988

PONSOR, U.S.M.

I have this day executed the Extradition Certification and Order of Commitment for Antonio Manzi upon the formal request of the Republic of Italy, in the form proposed by the Assistant United States Attorney. After hearing, and after review of the extensive documentation submitted in this case, I have found each of the proposed findings well supported.

The purpose of this memorandum is to



indicate, briefly, my reasons for rejecting the arguments offered in opposition to denying the respondent's "Motion to Order Government to Clarify Status of Foreign Conviction and Have Translated the Decision on the Appeal Thereof" (hereafter "Motion to Order").

At the outset, the limited role of the Magistrate in an extradition proceeding must be noted and underlined. An extradition proceeding is not a criminal prosecution, and this fact "reflects the nature of the certification of extraditability . . ."

. . . whether an alleged fugitive can be extradited for an offense committed outside the United States depends on our diplomatic agreements with the requesting country. The hearing is merely to ascertain whether a treaty applies and whether the evidence of criminal conduct is sufficient to justify his extradition and trial by that country. Since the executive branch is charged with the conduct of our foreign relations, the role of the



judge or magistrate is only to insure that this minimal showing has been made . . . The question of guilt or innocence is left to a determination in a different proceeding in another country.

Sabatier v. Dabrowski, 586 F. 2d 866, 869 (1st Cir. 1978) (emphasis supplied) (citations omitted).

More recently, the First Circuit has reaffirmed, in the context of habeas corpus proceeding challenging extradition, that appellate inquiry may be directed only to "(1) whether the magistrate had jurisdiction, (2) whether the offense charged is within the treaty and, by somewhat liberal extension, (3) whether there was a reasonable ground to believe the accused guilty." Romeo v. Roach, 820 F. 2d 540 (1st Cir. 1987)(Per Curiam), quoting Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 312 (1925).



Here, there is no dispute about this court's authority to conduct extradition proceedings or its jurisdiction over the fugitive. Moreover, since fingerprints of the respondent are included in the extradition documents, along with a clear photograph of the person being sought which the court had an opportunity to compare to the flesh and blood respondent at the hearing on this matter, there is no dispute on the identity of the party in question. This Antonio Manzi is the person being sought by the Italian government.

Finally, although the precise applicability of its provisions are contested, it is undisputed that a treaty governing extradition is in full force and effect between the United States of America and the Republic of



Italy.

In seeking the certification, the Government offers a number of alternate grounds for extradition, any one of which would be sufficient. The Government contends, first, that the respondent is wanted for completion of a five-year sentence for conviction of robbery, of which in excess of three years remains to be served. He is also wanted, according to the Government, to complete a one-year term of imprisonment for receiving stolen property. Even more seriously, the Government contends that the plaintiff has been convicted in absentia, during the pendency of this extradition proceeding, of criminal association, two acts of murder and attempted murder.

In approaching the question of whether there is reasonable ground to believe the accused guilty, the court



should employ the federal standard of probable cause. Greci v. Birknes, 527 F. 2d 956, 958-959 (1st Cir. 1976). Respondent's counsel's arguments to the contrary notwithstanding, the court finds that all of the Government's proffered justifications are sufficiently supported by the extensive documentation submitted by the Government to warrant issuance of the Extradition Certification.

Respondent, as noted, has filed a "Motion to Order" which seeks documentation and information by which the respondent alleges he might attack, first, the convictions in absentia for the two murders, the attempted murder and the criminal association, and, second, the conviction for receiving stolen property. As to the first item, the respondent alleges that his convictions




in absentia may have been overturned on appeal. He seeks a complete translation of a lengthy Italian appellate decision, the "complete docket" of the case, and an order requiring the Government to "provide the current status of these convictions . . . ." In support of the motion, respondent points to an appellate decision apparently relevant to co-defendants in the Italian prosecution, but not even mentioning the respondent by name. Respondent's attorney explains the absence of his client's name from the appellate decision by the fact that he was convicted in absentia. As the Government points out, however, two other co-defendants convicted in absentia are named in the appellate decision. The more likely explanation for the absence of respondent's name from the decision is its lack of any relevance to the



respondent.

More importantly, speculation about possible adverse appellate action regarding a conviction fully supported by appropriate documentation is not sufficient ground to deny certification on the facts of this case. As the Government's previous submissions demonstrate, even before respondent's conviction in absentia overwhelming evidence, much of it from accomplices and associates of the respondent, supported probable cause to believe he committed the very serious crimes charged. Thus, even without the conviction, there is ample support for extradition. In short, the proffered reason for seeking the information is doubtful at best and, in any case, irrelevant to the present proceeding.

As to the second item, respondent claims that he is entitled to credit for



As to the second item, respondent claims that he is entitled to credit for the time served here in the United States against the one-year conviction for receiving stolen property. If this time is credited, respondent argues, the length of sentence actually to be served drops below six months and is therefore ineligible as a justification for extradition. To support this argument, respondent seeks a copy of the docket of the case in question and copies of any Italian statutes that might support respondent's position. Even more than respondent's previous argument, this contention is utterly speculative. More importantly, if correct, it may be presented to the Italian authorities. It is worth noting, in fact, that as a practical matter the respondent, who is




serving a substantial sentence in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts for state narcotics offenses, would have been in jail during the entire pendency of this extradition proceeding regardless of any action by the Italian government. It seems doubtful under these circumstances that the Massachusetts prison time would be credited to the unexpired Italian sentence.

For the foregoing reasons, respondent's Motion to Order is hereby DENIED.


Respondent raises a number of other objections to extradition, mainly of a technical nature.

First, he argues that the sentence for armed robbery, which the Government contends is still pending and remains in excess of three years, was in fact reduced "to" six months. The Government contends that the proper translation of




the Italian is that the sentence was reduced "by" six months and that this reduction has been taken into consideration in calculating the better than three years remaining to be served. Regrettably, this magistrate is not fluent in Italian. Nevertheless, the Italian government has properly certified that a sentence in excess of three years awaits the respondent. A certified translation by the United States Department of State indicates that the proper translation is "by" and not "to." This is enough.

Second, respondent contends that the necessary factual summaries submitted by the Government in support of extradition are not properly signed by "magistrates" within the meaning of the applicable treaty. This allegation is destroyed by the contrary declaration of Mary Ellen



Warlow, Associate Director of the Office of International Affairs of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice, attached to the Government's Supplemental Memorandum and by the certification of the Italian (sic) ambassador.

Third, rerespondent contends that the Government has made an insufficient factual showing with regard to the murder, attempted murder and criminal association charges. Exhibit 14 submitted to the court presents more than sufficient evidence in support of these charges, to the extent this is required following the conviction in absentia. Similarly, as the Government's reply memorandum indicates, at 4, a sufficient statement of the penalty imposed and the time remaining regarding these penalties has been proffered by the Government. In addition, the Government's response in its Reply Memorandum, at 5, rebuts re-



spondent's claim that scienter is not required under Italian law for conviction for receiving stolen property.

Other objections raised by the respondent are technical in nature and simply do not suffice to avoid extradition, particularly in view of the limited nature of this proceeding. The plain fact is that the Government presents an unusually strong case for extradition. Several very serious crimes are alleged, all of them probably, and some of them certainly, supported by actual convictions. There is no need for any further delay. As noted, the Extradition Certification and Order of Commitment will issue simultaneously with this memorandum.

It is So Ordered.

/s/  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Michael A. Ponsor  
U. S. Magistrate



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS


IN THE MATTER OF )  
THE EXTRADITION ) M.B.D. NO. 85-08-F  
OF ANTONIO MANZI )

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EXTRADITION CERTIFICATION AND  
ORDER OF COMMITMENT

This matter came on for hearing September 8, 1987, and thereafter, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. [Sec.] 3184 following the provisional arrest of Antonio Manzi upon formal request of the Republic of Italy. Warrants of Arrest have been issued by the Court of Appeals in Naples for the surrender of Mr. Manzi to complete his sentence for robbery, to complete his sentence for receiving stolen property, and to serve a sentence upon his conviction in absentia for two murders, an attempted murder, and criminal association.

The Court, having considered the



evidence presented by the United States on behalf of Italy, and argument of counsel, finds as follows:

1. A Warrant of Arrest is pending against Mr. Manzi requiring that he complete serving a five-year sentence imposed upon his conviction for robbery. The conviction has been upheld on appeal. The balance of the sentence to be served is 3 years, 1 month and 1 day.

2. A Warrant of Arrest is pending against Mr. Manzi requiring that he serve one year imprisonment upon his conviction for receiving stolen property; that conviction also having been upheld on appeal.

3. A Warrant of Arrest is pending against Mr. Manzi requiring that he serve a twenty-eight year sentence, imposed upon his conviction in absentia on charges of criminal association, murder and attempted murder.

4. The acts upon which these charges




are based are proscribed, as felonies, by similar criminal provisions of federal law and the law of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

5. The charges against Mr. Manzi, and the fugitive warrants, are included in the provisions of Article II of the 1983 Extradition Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Italy, which Treaty is in full force and effect.

6. The Antonio Manzi before this Court is the same individual charged in the Warrants of Arrest and the subject of the request for extradition by the Republic of Italy.

7. The evidence before the Court establishes probable cause that Antonio Manzi committed the crimes of criminal association, murder of Giuseppe Fabi, murder of Pietro Tangredi, attempted murder of Biagio Cava, as alleged in the



Warrants of Arrest and is sufficient to warrant his extradition to Italy pursuant to the provisions of the 1983 Treaty.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this matter is certified to the Secretary of State together with all evidence before this Court, in order that a warrant may issue upon the requisition of the proper authorities for the surrender of Antonio Manzi according to the 1983 Extradition Treaty between the United States and Italy.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED:

1. That Antonio Manzi is committed to the custody of the United States Marshal, or his authorized representative, to be confined in appropriate facilities and to remain until he is surrendered to Italy pursuant to the Treaty; and,

2. That the Clerk of this Court shall forward to the Secretary of State a copy of this Certification and Order



and documents received as evidence.

/s/ -  
MICHAEL A. PONSOR  
United States Magistrate

Date: 5/18/88



UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

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No. 88-2128

IN THE MATTER OF THE EXTRA-  
DITION OF ANTONIO MANZI

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  
Petitioner, Appellee,

V.

ANTONIO MANZI,  
Respondent, Appellant,

JUDGMENT

Entered: November 1, 1989

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This cause came on to be heard on appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, and was argued by counsel.

Upon consideration whereof, It is now here ordered, adjudged and decreed as follows: The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

By the Court:

Francis P. Scigliano

Clerk